THE ROLE OF RISK AVERSION IN PREDICTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR by Luigi Guiso & Monica Paiella
Temi di discussione
del Servizio Studi
The role of risk aversion 
in predicting individual behavior
Number 546 - February 2005
by Luigi Guiso and Monica PaiellaThe purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working 
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:
GIORGIO GOBBI, MARCELLO BOFONDI, MICHELE CAIVANO, ANDREA LAMORGESE, FRANCESCO PATERNÒ, 
MARCELLO PERICOLI, ALESSANDRO SECCHI, FABRIZIO VENDITTI, STEFANIA ZOTTERI, RAFFAELA BISCEGLIA 
(Editorial Assistant).THE ROLE OF RISK AVERSION IN PREDICTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
by Luigi Guiso∗ and Monica Paiella∗∗
Abstract
We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion
based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky asset. We relate
this measure to a set of consumers’ decisions that in theory should vary with attitude towards
risk. We ﬁnd that elicited risk aversion has considerable predictive power for a number of
key household decisions such as choice of occupation, portfolio selection, moving decisions
and exposure to chronic diseases in ways consistent with theory. We also use this indicator to
address the importance of self-selection when relating indicators of risk to individual saving
decisions.
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1
Thetheory ofchoice under uncertainty implies that theattitudean individual has towards
risk is decisive in a variety of contexts that are critical for understanding individual behavior.
According to theory, differences in risk aversion among individuals should show up sharply in
their occupational choices, their decisions on how to allocate accumulated assets, how much
insurance to buy in the market and how much to self-insure. In some cases - as in simple
portfolio theory (Samuelson, 1969, Merton, 1969, and Gollier, 2001a) - theory goes so far as
to imply that all the differences across individuals in observed portfolio composition should
reﬂect differences in risk preferences. Thus, the well-documented massive heterogeneity
in portfolio shares across households
2 could all be traced back to such differences. More
generally, differences in risk aversion should affect individuals’ investment choices with the
more risk-aversebeing ready to forego relatively higherexpected returns for returns with lower
variability. The immediate implication is that more risk-averse individuals should have less
variable earnings but end up, on average, poorer. One key question then is how much of the
inequality in income and wealth distribution can be due to differences across individuals in
their risk preferences. The answer clearly depends on how much the attitudes towards risk
differ across consumers and how important risk aversion is in explaining behavior vis-à-vis
other income determinants that may themselves differ signiﬁcantly across individuals. In order
to be able to provide evidence on these issues one needs to be able to measure risk aversion at
the individual level. However, individual willingness to bear risk is not normally observable;
this is one reason why researchers have typically assumed that individuals have identical risk
preferences and so explained the observed differences in behavior and wealth by assuming
some form of market friction or imperfection that affects individuals differentially.
3
1 Luigi Guiso acknowledges ﬁnancial support from MURST, and the EEC for the TMR research project
“Specialisation versus diversiﬁcation: the Microeconomics of Regional Development and the Spatial Propaga-
tion of Shocks in Europe”. Cristiana Rampazzi provided excellent research assistantship. Only the authors are
responsible for the contents of this paper which does not reﬂect the Community’s opinion, nor the Bank of Italy’s.
2 Se Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2000).
3 For instance, inequalities in income and wealth have been related to limited access to ﬁnancial markets
either because of ﬁxed costs of investing in assets with high expected yield (Guvenen, 2002) or because of
rationing in credit markets arising from information and commitment problems (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2002).8
This paper makes two contributions to help sort out the role of differences in risk
preferences. First, weemploy informationon households’willingnessto payforahypothetical
risky security contained in the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), to recover a measure of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion of the
consumer’s lifetime utility function and check how much measured risk aversion differs
across individuals. Second, we relate this measure to various behaviors that according to
theory should be greatly affected by risk preferences. In particular, we focus on individuals’
occupational and portfolio choices, their demand for insurance, their investment in education,
the propensity to move or change jobs and their exposure to chronic diseases. We ﬁnd
unequivocal evidence that risk preferences differconsiderably across individuals and that these
differences have substantial explanatory power as regards individual decisions.
Although the vast majority of the survey participants are risk-averse according to our
measure, a small proportion (4 percent) are either risk-neutral or risk-loving (we will call this
group “risk-prone”); in addition, even among the risk-averse there is a lot of heterogeneity
in the degree of risk aversion, which shows that preferences for risk do differ signiﬁcantly
across individuals. Furthermore, these differences are systematically related to individual
choices that involve risk. Differences in risk preferences are important for understanding
differences in behavior across individuals. For instance, compared to the risk-prone, the risk-
averse are 6 percentage points less likely to be self-employed (corresponding to 36 percent of
the sample share of the self-employed), have a 6-point lower chance of holding risky securities
(corresponding to 42 percent of the sample mean), and have, on average, 110,000 euros less
in total net worth, 75 percent of the sample mean. Correspondingly, individuals with a low
degree of risk aversion (at the 10th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution) face earnings
that are 60 percent more variable than those of highly risk-averse individuals (90th percentile).
Ourﬁndings imply that individuals sort themselves out in such awaythat the highly risk-
averse face less risky prospects. This self-selection makes it problematic to assess the effect of
risk on choice, an issue that arises, for instance, in evaluating the effect of income uncertainty
on investment in risky assets or testing for precautionary savings. The problem here is that
the risk that agents face is correlated with preferences for risk that are unobservable. This
unobserved preference heterogeneity biases - normally towards zero - the measured effect of
risk. Since we observe risk preferences directly, we can assess the importance of self-selection9
for estimates of the effect of risk on behavior, and we do this with reference to precautionary
saving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our measure of risk
aversion. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence on risk aversion and individuals’ choices
in our cross-section of households. In Section 4 we summarize what theory says about the
effect of risk aversion on a number of household decisions: occupational choice, portfolio
allocation, insurance demand, investment in education, moving and job change. Section 5
presents the results of the estimates. In Section 6 we look more closely at the link between
attitudes towards risk and the mean and variance of individual income. Section 7 discusses
self-selection induced by risk attitudes and illustrates its relevance for precautionary savings
estimates. Section 8 concludes.
2. Measuring risk aversion
To measure risk aversion we exploit the 1995 wave of the Survey of Household Income
a n dW e a l t h( S H I W ) ,w h i c hi sr u ne v e r yt w oy e a r sb yt h eB a n ko fI t a l y . T h e1 9 9 5S H I W
collects data on income, consumption, real and ﬁnancial wealth and its composition, insurance
demand, type of occupation, educational attainment, geographic and occupational mobility,
and several demographic variables for a representative sample of 8,135 Italian households.
Balance-sheet items are end-of-period values. Income and ﬂow variables refer to 1995.
4
The 1995 survey had a section designed to elicit attitudes towards risk. Each participant
was offered a hypothetical negotiable asset and was asked to report the maximum price that he
would be willing to pay for it. Speciﬁcally:
“We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that you should answer as
if the situation were a real one. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring an
asset permitting you, with the same probability, either to gain 10 million lire or to
lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you would be prepared to pay
for this asset?”
Ten million lire is roughly equal to 5,000 euros. The expected gain from the investment
is equal to 16 percent of average household’s annual consumption. Thus, the investment
4 The appendix describes the survey contents, sample design, interviewing procedure and response rates in
more detail.10
represents a relatively large risk. Putting consumers face-to-face with a relatively large
investment is a better strategy to elicit risk attitudes when one relies, as we do, on expected
utility maximization to characterize risk aversion (see Rabin, 2000). In fact, expected utility
maximizers behave risk-neutrally with respect to small risks even if they are averse to larger
risks (Arrow, 1970).
5 The interviews are conducted personally at the consumer’s home by
professional interviewers. To help the respondent understand the question, the interviewers
showed an illustrative card and were ready to provide explanations. The respondent could
respond in one of three ways: a) declare the maximum amount he was willing to pay for the
asset, which we denote Zi; b) answer “don’t know”; c) not answer.
Notice that the way the hypothetical asset is designed implies that with probability 1/2
the respondent gets 10 million lire and with probability 1/2 he loses Zi. So the expected value
of the lottery is 1/2(10 − Zi). Clearly, Zi < 10 million lire, Zi = 10,a n dZi > 10 million lire
imply risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk loving, respectively. This characterizes attitudes
towards risk qualitatively. Within the expected utility framework a measure of the Arrow-
Pratt index of absolute risk aversion can also be obtained for each consumer. Let wi denote
household i0s endowment. Let ui(·) be its (lifetime) utility function and e Pi be the random
return on the security for individual i, taking values 10 million and −Zi with equal probability.




ui(wi + 10) +
1
2
ui(wi − Zi)=Eui(wi + e Pi), (1)
where E is the expectations operator. Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the right-
hand side of (1) around wi gives:



















5 Although we assume individuals are expected utility maximizers, it is fair to say that there is no common
experimental evidence that shows that individulasbehave aspredictedbythe expected utility model. See Camerer
(1995).11
Equation (3) uniquelydeﬁnes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion in terms of the
parameters of the hypothetical asset of the survey.
6 Obviously, for risk-neutral individuals (i.e.
those reporting Zi =1 0 ), Ri(wi)=0and for the risk-prone (those with Zi > 10), Ri(wi) < 0.
Notice that since the loss Zi or the gain from the investment need not be fully borne by or
beneﬁt current consumption but may be spread over lifetime consumption, our measure of risk
aversion is better interpreted as the risk aversion of the consumer’s lifetime utility.
7 As such,
it reﬂects not only the preference parameters that affect the curvature of the period utility,
but also aspects of the constraint set, such as any liquidity constraints or background risk an
individual faces, that affect an individual willingness to bear risk. To take this into account, in
our empirical estimates we will control for liquidity constraints and background risk.
A few comments on this measure and on how it compares with those used in other
studies are in order. First, our measure requires no assumption on the form of the individual
utility function, which is left unspeciﬁed. Second, it is not restricted to risk-averse individuals
but extends to the risk-neutral and the risk lovers. Third, our deﬁnition provides a point
estimate, rather than a range, of the degree of risk aversion for each individual in the sample.
These features distinguish our study from that of Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997)
who only obtain a range measure of (relative) risk aversion and a point estimate under the
assumption that preferences are strictly risk-averse and utility is of the CRRA type. However,
their elicitation strategy allows them to recover a measure of the risk aversion of period utility
instead of lifetime utility as we do. In this regard, our and their study should be viewed as
complementary.
8
6 Needless to say the approximation for Ri is good only if the risk is relatively “small” compared to wealth.
Thus, the approximation is likely to be less satisfactory for relatively poor households. We have checked our
results excluding households in the ﬁrst decile of the wealth distribution and found no signiﬁcant departures.
7 In a related paper (see Guiso and Paiella, 2001) we study the determinants of risk aversion and ﬁnd
that, once we control for the agent’s endowment, individual charactersitics, such as age, gender, education and
place of birth, have limited explanatory explanatory power and attitudes toward risk are characterized by massive
unexplained heterogeneity.
8 Tiseno (2002) shows that knowledge of the maximum subjective price function for a risk is sufﬁcient to
identify the risk aversion of a consumer lifetime utility. He also shows that under certain conditions the risk
aversion of lifetime utility and that of period utility are proportional.12
3. Descriptive evidence
The question on the risky asset was submitted to the whole sample of 8,135 heads of
household, but only 3,458 answered and were willing to purchase the asset. Of the 4,677 who
did not, 1,586 answered “do not know” and 3,091 refused to answer or to pay a positive price
(25 offered more than 20 million). This is likely to be due to the complexity of the question,
which might have led some participants to skip it altogether because of the relatively long
time required to understand its meaning and provide an answer. No-responses also reﬂect
the fact that the question was asked abruptly by the interviewers, not prepared for by “warm
up” questions. However, this strategy has its advantages: ﬁrst, the framing and timing of
the introductory questions could affect the response to the main question, thus distorting
the measure of the true preference parameter. Second, the abrupt approach avoids noise
respondents (i.e. those with a poor understanding of the question), as would probably happen
with “warm up” questions. Thus, while the high non-response rate signals that the question
is complex and there may be cognitive problems, it does not mean that those who chose to
respond gave erroneous answers. This is not to say that our gauge of risk aversion is free of
measurement error. However, if this is of the classical type, it will bias our results towards
ﬁnding small effects of risk aversion on behavior. Thus, our estimates should be regarded as
lower bounds of the true effects of risk preferences on consumer decisions.
9
Table Ireports descriptivestatistics forthesample of3,458 respondents to the risky-asset
question and for the sub-samples of risk-averse individuals and of the risk-prone.
10 The risk-
averse make up the great majority of respondents: 96 percent, in fact, set a maximum price
lower than the potential gain. The risk-prone consists of 144 individuals, of whom 125 are
risk-neutral and 19 are risk-loving. The mean reported price is 2.2 million lire (1.8 million for
9 The reported prices are likely to be affected by a well-known problem in experimental economics: indi-
viduals asked to price hypothetical lotteries (or risky assets) tend to report lower buying than selling prices (see
Kagel and Roth, 1995, pp. 68-86). If the “true” willingness to pay/accept for a lottery is in between the reported
bid and ask prices, the reported willingness to pay (sell) will lead to upward (downward) biased estimates of in-
dividual risk aversion. Since our survey elicits the willingness to pay it is likely that our individual risk aversion
measures are biased upward. But experiments are silent on whether the extent of the bias (or the difference be-
tween bid and ask prices) is correlated with some observable individual characteristics. If the bias is proportional
to the reported price and constant across individuals, our results will be unaffected.
10 Those who answered have somewhat different characteristics than non-respondents. They are on average
6 years younger than the total sample, slightly better educated (1.3 more years of schooling) and have higher
shares of male-headed households (79.8 compared to 74.4 percent), of married people (78.9 and 72.5 percent)
and are signiﬁcantly more likely to have children (41.9 and 31.6 percent, respectively).13
the risk averse and 11.2 million for the risk prone, Panel A), about 36 percent of the expected
gain from the lottery. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity. The value of the standard
deviation is 2.7 million, larger than the average reported price, while the 90th percentile is
5 million lire, 100 times larger than the 10th percentile. This difference in willingness to
pay translates into large differences in risk aversion: the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional
distribution of the degree of absolute risk aversion is 2.5 times as great as the 10th percentile.
We also report a measure of the degree of relative risk aversion obtained multiplying absolute
risk aversion by household income. Median relative risk aversion is 5.8 (6.0 among the risk-
averse) and ranges between 1.9 (10th percentile) and 13.3 (90th percentile), showing that there
is considerable diversity in aversion to proportional risks too.
11
Panel B reports summary statistics of the characteristics of the respondents. The two
sub-samples of risk-prone and of risk-averse consumers exhibit several interesting differences.
The risk-averse are younger, they are less likely to be male, to be married, to be borne in the
North of Italy and more likely to have children.
Panel C shows summary statistics for the variables that in principle should be affected by
individual preferences for risk. Strong differences emerge in the type of occupation: among
the risk-averse the share of self-employed is 17.4 percent; among the risk-prone it is much
higher at 29.2 percent. This ordering is reversed for public sector employees. The risk-prone
are public employees in 27 percent of cases, the risk-averse in 28 percent. As we argue, these
differences are likely to reﬂect self-selection, with more risk-averse individuals choosing safer
jobs. Further, the risk averse are less likely to have changed jobs more than twice and to
be chronically ill and they tend to invest less in education. On average, the risk-averse are
signiﬁcantly less wealthy than the risk-prone (275 million lire - 142,000 euros - of mean net
worth compared with 330 million - 277,000 euros) and expect to earn lower but less variable
11 Since our risk aversion measure is the risk aversion of the utility function strictly speaking the measure
of relative risk aversion we report is correct if consumers have one year horizon. If consumers have a lifetime
horizon than the proper scale variable should be lifetime wealth. We also compute a measure of RRA that relies
on a measure of lifetime wealth. Obviously, estimating lifetime wealth is fraught with problems. To construct
one we take current consumption, assume individuals have a ﬂat consumption proﬁle over the life cycle, assume
maximum life span is 80 years (about life expectancy at birth), and assume all die without wealth. For each
individual in our sample we compute the present value of consumption from current age to age 80 assuming a
discount rate of 10% which incorporates both the rate on borrowing and the probability of dying before age 80,
and use this to compute relative risk aversion. The median relative risk aversion of the value function estimated
this way is 16.14
salaries. Finally, they have a lower share of risky asset holders (13.5 percent compared to 36.1)
but also of households holding life, health or theft insurance.
4. Predicting behavior with risk aversion
Attitudes towards risk should affect consumers’ willingness to take risk in a variety of
situations. In this section we review theoretical arguments for the effects of risk preferences
on individuals’ behavior and then test whether our measure of risk preferences has predictive
power with respect to consumer choices in ways consistent with theory.
4.1 Occupational choice and entrepreneurship
If different jobs differ not only in expected return but also in the riskiness of those
returns, individuals should sort themselves into occupations on the basis of their risk aversion.
One of the few theories of entrepreneurship, put forward by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), is
indeed based on heterogeneity in risk aversion among individuals. Since running a business is
equivalent to the choice of a risky prospect, the less risk-averse will become entrepreneurs
while the relatively risk-averse will prefer to be employees and work for a ﬁxed wage.
Thus, heterogeneity in risk aversion may explain who becomes an entrepreneur in a society.
Understanding the role of preferences in the decision to set up a ﬁrm vis-à-vis other possible
explanations (e.g. ability to combine factors of production as in Lucas (1978) or access to the
loan market as in Evans and Jovanovic (1989)) is of critical relevance for policy since if tastes
for risk are innate and cannot be acquired they can potentially be a formidable obstacle to the
growth of business.
4.2 Portfolio choice
Standard portfolio theory predicts that the amount of wealth an individual is willing to
invest in risky assets depends on his degree of risk aversion. Given the return and riskiness
of the risky assets, the more risk-averse should hold safer portfolios. Furthermore, under
the conditions for the validity of the two-fund separation theorem, since all investors face
the same distribution of asset returns, differences in portfolio composition across individuals
should only reﬂect differences in their degree of risk aversion. Although the conditions for
the two-fund separation theorem are rather severe (see Gollier, 2001a) we expect differences15
in risk aversion across individuals to help predict differences in portfolio holdings. Besides
helping understand why risky asset holders differin the shareof wealth invested in risky assets,
differences in risk aversion may also help explain why some do not invest at all in risky assets
(e.g. stocks). Ifthere are ﬁxed costs of acquiring risky assets, those who in the absence of these
costs would optimally invest little in the risky assets - because they are strongly risk-averse -
will ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to incur the ﬁxed cost and enjoy the excess return. Thus, differences
in risk aversion should also help predict who will become a stockholder and who will not.
4.3 Insurance demand
The classical model of the demand for casualty insurance elaborated by Mossin (1968)
implies that risk-averse individuals should fully insure if insurance is offered at fair terms. If
insurance is unfair, the amount purchased will depend on one’s degree of risk aversion: the
more risk-averse will demand more insurance coverage. Nevertheless, even some risk averse
may choose not to insure if departure from fairness is signiﬁcant. Thus, differences in risk
aversion should predict not only the amount of insurance demand among insurance holders
but also the decision to buy an insurance policy among risk-averse consumers.
4.4 Investment in education
Likeall forms ofinvestment, that in education entails risk: in fact, compared to accepting
a current job offer at a known wage, the decision to obtain more education exposes the investor
to a risk of failure - because the program may turn out more difﬁcult than anticipated or
because the individual later discovers he lacks the necessary ability. He may thus lose the sum
invested (including the direct fees, the living costs and the forgone salary in the alternative
job). In addition, since the investment in education only bears fruit after a relatively long
time span, the investor also bears the uncertainty over the market value of the degree at time
of completion. Thus, the less risk-averse individuals should be more likely to obtain higher
education. Brunello (2002) shows formally that the number of years of education a person
optimally chooses depends negatively on absolute risk aversion.
12
12 Compensation for risk may thus be an additional reason why education carries a higher return (Hartog and
Vijverberg, 2001).16
4.5 Migration, job change and health
The decision to migrate or to change jobs and the consumer’s health status (in-so-far as it
depends on how cautious a consumer is), all depend on one’s attitude towards risk. Compared
with staying in the area of birth, migrating to another area or country entails undertaking
a risky prospect as it implies leaving a sure and known prospect for an unknown, though
typically more promising future. Similarly, leaving a known job and taking a new one may
imply incurring new risks. Thus, one expects more risk-averse individuals to be less likely to
move and to change jobs than the risk-prone. Also, since risk-averse consumers should behave
more prudently, they should have better health status; consistent with this intuition Eeckhoudt
and Hammit (2002) show that individuals that are more averse to ﬁnancial risk have a higher




Table II reports the results of estimating probit regressions for occupational choice. We
focus on the household head’s decision to be self-employed (ﬁr s tt w oc o l u m n s ) ,t ob eab o n a
ﬁde entrepreneur (third and fourth columns) and to be a public sector employee (last two
columns). All regressions include as controls a second-order polynomial in the age of the
household head, dummies for gender, education, region of birth and a full set of region of
residence dummies to account for local factors that may affect job choice, such as differences
in the degree of development of local ﬁnancial markets (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004).
In addition we include dummies for the occupation of the household head’s father to capture
any intergenerational links in occupational choice. For the analysis we use a measure of
absolute risk aversion, which may vary with household resources. Hence, in order to avoid
that the risk aversion index captures any correlation between the left-hand-side choice variable
and an individual’s wealth or income, in this and in all regressions that follow we control
13 In the discussion in the text we have ignored that risky decisions may interact, in the sense that, for
instance how much insurance one is willing to buy may depend on how much portfolio risk one is exposed
to, so that endogenous exposure may act as a form of background risk. This possibility, noticed by Eeckhoudt
and Gollier (1999) and Gollier (2001b), is not directly addressed by our estimates. However, in so far as these
interactions exist, they should be reﬂected in our measure of risk aversion, in the sense that individuals who are
already more exposed to endogenous risks will be less willing to pay for the hypothetical security and thus turn
out to be more risk averse. We have also run regressions inserting as explanatory variables some of the risk
choices that we attempt to explain. For example, using occupational dummies in the portfolio regressions and
vice versa. These regressions, not reported but available on request, leave our results unaffected.17
for the level of income and wealth of the household. In the case of occupational choice, for
example, if wealth is not controlled for, absolute risk aversion may have a negative effect
on the decision to become a self-employed simply because it declines with wealth and poor
individuals lack the ﬁnancial muscles to set up a business in the presence of imperfect capital
markets. Finally, to account for the fact that the risk aversion measure reﬂects also aspects of
the set of constraints that affect an individual willingness to take up risks, we insert a measure
of the liquidity constraints an individual may be exposed to and a measure of the background
risk he faces. As to the ﬁrst, we pool together several years of the SHIW and compute the
fraction of individuals in each province that applied for a loan and were turned down or were
discouraged from borrowing (did not apply in the expectation that would have been turned
down). Provinces with a high share of liquidity constrained individuals are areas where raising
funds is more difﬁcult, which limits the opportunities to time-diversify any risk currently taken
and can be expected to make individuals more reluctant to undertake actions involving extra
risks. To measure background risk, we rely per-capita GDP growth at the provincial level for
the period 1952-1992, which we employ compute a measure of the variability of GDP growth
in the province of residence. For each province we regress (log) GDP on a time trend and
compute the residuals. We then calculate the variance of the residuals and attach this estimate
to all households living in the same province. The variance of GDP growth in the province is
an estimate of aggregate risk and should be largely exogenous to the individual risk attitude
unless risk-averse consumers move to provinces with low variance GDP.
The ﬁrst column of Table II reports the regression results based on for the whole
sample. The attitude towards risk is measured using a dummy for risk-averse consumers.
The benchmark is the group of risk-prone. The left-hand-side variable is set equal to one
if the household head is a bona ﬁde entrepreneur, both in manufacturing and retailing, or a
professional (a doctor, a lawyer, etc.). Risk-averse consumers are less likely than the risk-
prone to be self-employed, and the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at less than the 5
percent conﬁdence level. The differences are economically substantial: being risk-averse
rather than risk-prone lowers the probability of being self-employed by 6 percentage points, or
36 percentofthesampleshareofself-employed. This evidencesuggeststhatself-selection into
occupations triggered by differences in individuals’ preferences is indeed an important feature
of reality, an issue to which we return in Section 5 when we examine the correlation between
the degree of absolute risk aversion and a subjective measure of the variance of earnings. The18
second column restricts the sample to risk-averse households and uses as explanatory variable
our measure of absolute risk aversion. Since the risk-prone group includes relatively few
observations we feel more conﬁdent exploiting the variability in the degree of risk aversion
rather then differences in the regime of attitudes towards risk. Obviously, within the class of
risk-averse individuals those who are more strongly risk-averse should be less likely to choose
risky jobs. This is conﬁrmed by the estimates, which imply a negative coefﬁcient for the
degree of risk aversion: increasing absolute risk aversion by one standard deviation lowers the
probability of being self-employed by 1.2 percentage points (7 percent of the unconditional
probability).
In the third and fourth column we focus on pure business entrepreneurs, where the
amount of risk-taking is probably greater than for other categories of self-employed. Results
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the ﬁrst two columns for the self-employed: being
r i s k - a v e r s ea sc o m p a r e dt ob e i n gr i s k - p r o n em a k e si tl e s sl i k e l yt ob ea ne n t r e p r e n e u ra n d
among the risk-averse, those who are more risk-averse are less likely to be entrepreneurs. The
inclusion of the self-employed in the control group, together with employees, may explain
why we lose precision in the estimation of the coefﬁcients.
The ﬁfth and sixth columns look at the probability of being a public sector employee for
the whole sample and for the sample of risk-averse individuals. Consistent with the general
perception that public jobs are more secure,
14 our estimates show that risk-averse individuals
are more likely than the risk-prone to work in the public sector, though the coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant only at the 34 percent level. Among the risk-averse, the probability of choosing
the safer occupation is an increasing and statistically signiﬁcant function of the degree of risk
aversion: increasing the latter by one standard deviation raises the probability of being a public
sector employee by little less than 2 percentage points (about 7 percent of the sample mean),
suggesting again that risk preferences have a strong impact on job choice.
It is worth noticing that in all regressions the occupation of the father of the household
head is highly signiﬁcant statistically and shows a strong positive correlation with the son
current occupation. Sons of entrepreneurs or the self-employed are more likely to become
themselves entrepreneurs or self-employed and less likely to be public employees, and
14 In Italy for instance, public sector employees cannot be laid off except in a few extreme circumstances
of misconduct. In addition, public sector jobs provide less variable on-the-job wages (see Guiso, Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2002).19
similarly for the sons of public employees. The effects are also very important economically:
having a self-employed father raises the chances of the son being self-employed by 9
percentage points, 50 percent of the unconditional mean; if he is a bona ﬁde entrepreneur,
the chances that the son also becomes an entrepreneur are higher by 7 percentage points and
those of becoming a public employee, if the father is one, rise by 11 points. These remarkable
effects are obtained after we control for individual preferences towards risk; thus, they do
not reﬂect intergenerational correlation in individuals willingness to deal with risk but other
factors that affect occupation choice, such as access to information, or the inheritance of one’s
father’s business or professional practice, thus shedding light on the debate started by Galton
(1869) on the correlation in fortunes across generations.
15 Finally, it isinteresting to notice that
our measure of background risk has a negative effect on the probability of choosing to be an
entrepreneur or self-employed and a positive effect on that of being a public sector employee,
consistent with theideathat background risk discourages independentrisk taking. On theother
hand, the proxy for liquidity constraints has the “wrong” sign (positive for the self-employed
and negative for the public employees). This might reﬂect the fact that, when deciding whether
to extend credit to a household, intermediaries condition on an applicant’s occupation as a
proxy for income stability and a self-employed has a more variable income than a public
sector employee. However, for both variables the estimated coefﬁcients are poorly estimated.
5.2 Asset allocation
Table III shows the effect of the risk attitude indicators and of the degree of risk aversion
on the ownership and portfolio share of risky ﬁnancial assets, i.e. private bonds, stocks and
mutual funds. Theright-hand-sidevariableset includes total net worth, non-assetincome(both
measured in hundred million lira ) and liquidity constraint and background risk indicators, in
addition to a second-order polynomial in age, dummies for gender, education, for the region
of birth and for that of residence. The risk-averse indicator has a negative effect on the risky
asset ownership decision, and its coefﬁcient is highly signiﬁc a n t . W h e ne s t i m a t e do nt h e
whole sample of households, the probability of holding risky ﬁnancial assets (ﬁrst column)
is almost half as great among risk-averse consumers as among the risk-prone. Compared
15 It can be shown that this result is unaffected by our measure of risk aversion being measured with error
provided the parents occupational choice is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the risk aversion of the
individual, a very reasonable assumption.20
to the latter, risk-averse investors have a 6-point lower chance of holding risky securities,
corresponding to 42 percent of the sample mean (equal to 14.4 percent).
16 Among risk-averse
consumers (second column), the probability of holding risky assets is a decreasing function
of our measure of absolute risk aversion, and the coefﬁcient is precisely estimated. A one-
standard-deviation increase in absolute risk aversion lowers the probability of holding risky
assets by 1.1 percentage points (7.8 percent of the unconditional probability). The third and
fourth columns report Tobit estimates of the portfolio share of risky assets (ratio of risky to
total ﬁnancial assets). This set of results conﬁrms the probit estimates: the share invested
in risky assets declines as the degree of risk aversion increases and is lower among the risk-
averse than among the risk-prone. Consistent with the predictions of the classical theory of
portfolio choice, differences in risk attitudes prove to be powerful determinants of portfolio
composition.
5.3 Insurance demand
We report the estimates of the effect of risk attitudes on the demand for insurance in
Table IV, distinguishing among life, health and casualty insurance. Standard insurance theory
predicts that, provided that insurance premiums depart from fair pricing, differences in risk
aversion should predict both the decision to buy insurance and the amounts bought, with more
risk-averse individuals being more likely to take out insurance and to hold more of it when
they do. We test these predictions by focusing on the sub-sample of risk-averse individuals
and estimate a probit model for whether the household has insurance and a Tobit model
for the amount of insurance purchased (i.e. the value of insurance premiums) scaled with
consumption. To account for differences in household endowments and in human capital,
wealth and income are included among the right-hand-side variables. In all cases we ﬁnd that
more risk-averse consumersarelesslikelytoholdinsuranceandthattheybuylessof it, andthe
effect is in most cases statistically signiﬁcant. This puzzling ﬁnding contradicts the predictions
of the simple models of insurance demand.
17 Interestingly, the proxy for background risk
16 Thus, differences inrisk aversion can help understandthe “stockholding puzzle”, i.e. the well-documented
feature of households portfolios that only a fraction of the households invests in stocks.
17 The implication that more risk averse individuals should buy more insurance has a very strong intuitive
appealandnotﬁndingitinthedataissomewhatdisappointing. Atthemomentwehavenoconvincingexplanation
for the ﬁnding. Two admittedly unsatisfactory possibilities are the following. One is that insurance companies
are able to price-discriminate on the basis of customers’ risk aversion. This would lead to higher premiums for21
has a positive effect of the decision to have insurance and on the amount to buy, consistent
with theoretical predictions though the high standard errors of the coefﬁcient do not allow
reliable inference. As for liquidity constraints, their effect is in principle ambiguous: they
make individuals more risk averse and thus more prone to insure, but at the same time, when
the household faces a high shadow interest rate, paying premiums now for possible insurance
beneﬁts later could be a bad deal. The estimates seem to suggest that the ﬁrst effect dominates,
but the coefﬁcients are never statistically signiﬁcant.
5.4 Investment in education
We report the effects of risk attitudes on the investment in education in Table V. Our
left-hand-side variable is the number of years of education an individual has obtained. The set
of controls includes individual income and wealth, a second-order polynomial in age (or year
of birth) to account for differences in the return to schooling across different cohorts, a dummy
for gender and a full set of regional dummies to proxy for differences across areas in the return
to education. In addition, we insert four dummies for the educational attainment of the father
of the household head to account for intergenerational persistence in education, ﬁnding strong
supportive evidence. As shown in the ﬁrst column, compared to the risk-prone, risk-averse
individuals invest less in education and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant: being risk-averse
lowers education by over one year, on average. Among the risk-averse those who are more
averse invest less in education and again the effect is strongly signiﬁcant (second column).
more risk-averse consumers, who would then reduce insurance demand. This explanation - which we consider
unlikely - relies on the assumption that personal risk aversion is observable. Another tentative explanation is
that individuals can act to self-insure against the consequences of adverse events. This leads them to replace
market insurance with self-insurance. If market insurance is sold at highly unfair prices, while self-insurance is
relatively efﬁcient - in the sense that one extra euro of current spending results in a large reduction in the loss
- an increase in risk aversion can reduce market insurance and increase self-insurance. If this explanation were
true, self-insurance which is not observed in our data and cannot be controlled for, would be picked up by our
measure of risk aversion which reﬂects substitutability between self-insurance and market insurance, giving rise
to a negative correlation between risk aversion and market insurance demand. A third, perhaps more appealing
explanation for the negative coefﬁcient is reverse causality. If lack of insurance is due to highly unfair pricing
that is originated by unobserved and uncontrolled local insurance market characteristics, then individuals in these
locations will face a greater background risk which makes them less willing to take on the risks proffered by the
question, resulting in a higher measured risk aversion.22
5.5 Moving, job changes and health status
Table VI shows the results for the decisions to migrate and change jobs and for health
status. The ﬁrst two columns estimate a model for the probability that an individual has moved
from his region of birth to another region. In the sample, 18.5 percent of household heads were
born in a region different from the one where they currently live. Since the regressions include
a full set of dummies for region of birth, local factors affecting the decision to move, such as
labor market conditions, wage prospects in the area, etc., are accounted for. We also control for
age, gender and education. Compared to the risk-prone, the risk-averse are less likely to have
moved, but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant (ﬁrst column). The second column reports
the estimates for the restricted group of risk-averse individuals. The degree of risk aversion
has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on the probability of having moved; increasing the degree
of risk aversion by one standard deviation lowers the probability by 1 percentage points, or 5.5
percent of the sample mean.
18
The third and fourth columns show the results for the propensity to change jobs. The
left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head has changed jobs at least
twice, and zero otherwise. About 33 percent of the consumers in our sample have changed
jobs more than twice. Being risk-averse compared to being risk-prone lowers the probability
of being a job changer, but the coefﬁcient is not precisely estimated. Within the group of risk-
averse individuals, however, a higher degree of risk aversion has a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant effect on the probability of changing jobs; a one-standard deviation increase in risk
aversion lowers the probability of taking the risks connected to changing job by 1.2 percentage
points. The last two columns report probit regressions for the probability of being affected by
a chronic disease. When the total sample is used the estimates indicate that the risk-averse
are signiﬁcantly less likely than the risk-prone to incur a chronic disease, with an effect equal
to 19 percentage points, about 91 percent of the sample share of households with a chronic
disease. When the sample is restricted to the risk-averse, the degree of risk aversion has the
wrong sign.
18 As pointed out by Daveri and Faini (1999), migration may be triggered by households’ need to diversify
their sourcesofincome, spreadingincome earnersgeographically. The implication isthat membersof households
(heads) that are more risk-averse will tend to work in different geographical locations rather than bunch in the
same place. We cannot test this prediction since in our data a household groups only the individulas who live in
the same house.23
Overall, the evidence in Tables III to VII implies that attitudes towards risk have
considerable explanatory power for several important consumer decisions. In some cases,
namely for occupational and portfolio choice, our evidence strongly suggests that leaving out
measures of risk aversion in emIn a world of incomplete markets the attitude towards risk,
measured by the willingness to accept a fair lottery, may vary between consumers not only
because ofdifferences in taste parameters but also becausethey facedifferent environments. In
Section 2 we discuss how risk aversion can be affected by background risk. In this Section we
test whether the attitudes towards risk are affected by the presence of uninsurable, independent
risksandbythepossibilityofbeingliquidity-constrainedinthefuture. Tomeasurebackground
risk we rely on per-capita GDP growth at the provincial level for the period 1952-1992, which
we use to compute a measure of the variability of GDP growth in the province of residence.
For each province we regress (log) GDP on a time trend and compute the residuals. We then
calculate the variance of the residuals and attach this estimate to all households living in the
same province. The main advantage of this variable compared with subjective measures of
future income uncertainty, such as those analyzed by Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002), is
that it is likely to be truly exogenous and so, unlike the subjective measures pirical analysis of
household behavior is likely to be a substantial problem.
6. Risk, return and risk aversion
The results in the previous section show that risk-averse individuals tend to undertake
safer actions when they choose their occupation, invest in education and allocate their savings,
decide to move or change jobs. Choosing safer actions means, in equilibrium, choosing
prospectswithalowerbut morepredictablepayoff. Asaconsequence, themorerisk-aversethe
individual, the lower, but the less variable his income, on average. To check these implications
we focus on the sample of risk averse consumers and exploit information available in the 1995
SHIW on the subjective probability distribution of future earnings
19 to construct a measure
of expected earnings and their variance and correlate it with consumers’ risk aversion. Since
19 Four questions on income expectations were put to half of the overall sample after excluding the retired
and people not in the labor force (a total of 4,799 individuals). The employed, the unemployed and the job seekers
are asked to state, on a scale from 0 to 100, their chances of having a job in the 12 months following the interview.
Each individual assigning a positive probability to being employed is then asked to report the minimum and the
maximum he or she expects to earn if employed, and the probability of earning less than the midpoint of the
support of the distribution. The exact wording of these questions is reported in the appendix. The answers are
then used to compute expected earningsand their variance (see Guisoet al., 2002, for details on the computation).24
the subjective probability questions were put to only half of the sample, these regressions are
based on a much smaller sample.
T a b l eV I I ,i nt h eﬁrst column, reports the results of the estimates where expected
earnings is the left-hand-side variable. We control for age to account for experience and
its productivity effects on wages, for gender and family size, as well as for differences in
economic development (and thus wage levels) across areas by inserting a full set of regional
dummies; we also control for education to account for differences in returns arising from
differences in human capital. Finding a negative correlation between expected future earnings
a n da b s o l u t er i s ka v e r s i o nm a yr e ﬂect decreasing absolute risk aversion rather than choice of
low-income-safer jobs by the more risk averse. To partially address this reverse causality issue
we insert in the regression the level of individual wealth. Being more risk-averse translates
into lower expected labor income, and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant and economically
important: having a risk aversion coefﬁcient equal to the 90th percentile implies a level of
expected earnings that is 5.4 million lire lower than that for the 10th percentile (21 percent of
mean expected earnings). These results are consistent with the idea that the more risk-averse
will, on average, end up poorer.
The second column shows the regression for the standard deviation of expected earnings.
After controlling for age, gender, education, region of residence and accumulated wealth,
more risk-averse consumers face lower earnings variance, and the effect is highly signiﬁcant.
Economically, those with a degree of risk aversion in the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional
distribution face an income risk, as measured by the standard deviation of expected earnings,
that is 70 percent lower than that of those at the 10th percentile. The last column further reﬁnes
these results by adding to the regression the expected value of future income and considering
the risk/return options faced by individuals. Since expected income represents the premium
the market offers for bearing more risk, once one controls for expected earnings, risk aversion
should no longer affect the variance of earnings. And this is indeed the case. Once expected
earnings is added to the regression, the coefﬁcient of the degree of risk aversion becomes six
times smaller and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. While these results are consistent with
more risk-averse individuals earning less because they choose safer jobs, the possibility of
being driven by reverse causality cannot be ruled out by these estimates, even if we control25
for the level of individual accumulated assets. For this, more research is needed that brings
exogenous variation in risk aversion.
7. Preferences about risk: the consequences of self-selection
The evidence presented in the previous sections shows that risk attitudes have important
effects on observable behavior and that risk-averse individuals sort themselves into activities
that entail lower exposure to risk. This self-selection is relevant in many situations where one
is interested in studying the effect of risk on choice. For instance, hours worked will in general
depend on wage riskiness (see Block and Heineke (1973) and Killingsworth (1983)) and
higher wage variability may reduce leisure. Similarly, precautionary savings decisions will be
affected by the income risk faced by prudent consumers (Leland (1982), Drezè and Modigliani
(1972)); labor income risk may also affect portfolio choice and insurance demand, inducing
investors to pick up safer portfolios or demand more insurance in order to reduce overall
exposure to risk (Kimball (1993)). In order to assess the relevance of risk for consumers’
decisions one needs variation in risk. This is often unobserved and has thus been proxied with
observable variables. Typically, since Friedman (1957)’s study of the consumption function,
labor income risk has been measured with occupational dummies (e.g. Skinner 1988). More
recently, starting with the work of Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992), survey measures of
the subjective probability distribution of future income have been used to obtain indicators
of the expected value and riskiness of an individual’s labor income. These measures have
then been used to test for precautionary savings and for the effects of background risk on
insurance demand and portfolio choice. The problem with these studies is self-selection: labor
income risk is endogenous, because more risk-averse individuals sort themselves into safer
occupations. If risk aversion is unobservable, estimates of the effect of labor income risk on
choice will be inconsistent because the measure of risk is correlated with the error term which
contains the (unobserved) preference parameter.
In this section we offer evidence on the importance of self-selection in estimating
precautionary savings by proxying risk with a dummy for self-employment.
20 We estimate
20 Fuchs and Schündeln (2003) address the relevance of self-selection for estimates of precautionary saving
by comparing the saving behaviour of East and West German households after uniﬁcation. They argue that
under Communisms, allocation to jobs in East Germany was essentially exogenous and not driven by individual
preferences, contrary to West Germany. They compare the effect of being self-employed (their proxy for earnings
risk) on the propensity to save in the two countries after uniﬁcation and argue that the stronger effect found for26
a saving function based on a life-cycle model extended to allow for precautionary savings
due to earnings uncertainty. Under a set of somewhat restrictive assumptions, the model has a
closed form solution for thesaving rate where the precautionary motive is additive with respect
to life-cycle savings (Caballero, 1991), which we approximate as follows:
si = a0wi + a1yi + a2zi + a3iσi + ui (4)
where si is household i savings, yi its labor income, wi is the household’s net-worth and
zi is a vector of demographic variables. The precautionary saving component is captured
by the fourth term on the right-hand-side where household labor income risk, σi, is proxied
by a dummy variable for self-employment. The coefﬁcient a3i reﬂects the strength of the
precautionary motive, as measured by the degree of absolute prudence, which if preferences
are of the CARA variety is equal to the degree of absolute risk aversion; this is why a3i is
household-speciﬁc. Self-selection emerges because strongly risk-averse individuals choose
safer jobs and will be less exposed to income risk. If risk aversion is unobservable it will
show up in the residual and will bias the precautionary motive estimate downwards. Since we
observe individuals’ risk aversion we can assess the importance of the self-selection bias in
estimates of precautionary savings.
To illustrate, Table VIII shows the results of the estimates where variables are scaled by
household earnings. The ﬁrst column reports the estimates when the self-selection problem
is ignored. The self-employment dummy - our proxy for labor income risk - is statistically
signiﬁcant but carries a negative coefﬁcient. This is contrary to the precautionary savings
hypothesis but is consistent with a strong self-selection bias if risk aversion has a strong
effect on individual occupational choice, as shown in Section 5. To check whether the result
is indeed driven by self-selection we interact our measure of risk aversion (scaled by labor
income) with the self-employment dummy and use this variable as a measure of risk in the
regression. The results, shown in the second column of Table VIII, reveal a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant effect of this risk-aversion-weighted measure of risk consistent with the
predictions of precautionary savings models. Computed at the sample mean of risk aversion,
being self-employed raises the saving rate by 5.2 percentage points, or about 28 percent of the
East Germany households is an estimate of the effect of self-selection.27
median saving rate in the sample, suggesting that precautionary saving exists and is relevant,
once self-selection is properly addressed.
8. Conclusions
Theory of choice under uncertainty implies that preferences for risk should strongly
affect individuals’ choices in a variety of contexts. Thus, differences in risk attitudes across
individuals should be very important in explaining observed differences in behavior. In some
instances, theory suggests that differences in attitudes towards risk could be the only factor
affecting differences in behavior. We have used a survey-based measure of individuals’
willingnessto payforahypotheticalrisky assettoconstructameasureoftheArrow-Prattindex
of absolute risk aversion at the individual level. We have then related this measure to a number
ofchoices underuncertainty. Ourresults showthat thismeasurehas strong predictivepoweron
some key consumer decisions including occupational choice, portfolio allocation, investment
in education, job change and moving decisions, in ways that are consistent with what theory
predicts. In some cases the effects are extremely substantial. For instance, being risk-averse
as opposed to being risk-neutral or risk-loving, raises the probability of being self-employed
by as much as 36 percent of the sample mean and the chances of holding risky assets by 42
percent of the sample mean. Our evidence shows strongly that individuals differ markedly
in their attitudes towards risk and that these differences lead them to sort themselves out in
such a way that the more risk-averse choose lower returns in exchange for lower risk exposure
when they invest their assets, choose their occupation, decide to invest in education, migrate
or change jobs or to take precautions against illness. How important, then, are differences in
risk aversion in explaining income inequality? One way to answer is to look at how much
of the variability in expected earnings is explained by differences in risk aversion compared
to other factors. A regression of expected earnings on a second-order polynomial in age, a
set of dummies for place of birth and a dummy for gender explains 6.4 percent of the sample
variability in expected earnings. Adding risk aversion explains an additional 2.2 percent of
the sample variability, about a third of what is explained by age, gender and area of birth!
Furthermore, if dummies for father’s occupation are included - as proxies for intergenerational
transmission of inequality - they can explain an additional 1.2 percent of the variability. Thus,
differences in attitudes on risk are at least as important in explaining differences in average28
income across individuals as are such variables as age, gender, place of birth and family of
origin, which are deemed to have a substantial explanatory power on income levels.
Overall, these results suggest that it pays to devote resources to collect data on individual
preferences towards risk. However, in future research it will be important to jointly elicit
information on the absolute risk aversion of the value function - as done in the SHIW - and
the relative risk aversion of the underlying felicity function, as pursued in the Health and
Retirement Survey. This would allow to clarify many issues including the possibility of telling
apart the effect on choice of deep preference for risk from that of aspects of the environment
that impact on individuals willingness to bear risk such as those arising from imperfections in
credit markets and unisurability of labor income risk.Table I: Descriptive statistics
All the variables refer to the household head, unless stated otherwise. Z denotes the amount households
are willing to invest in the risky asset and is in million lira. ‘Children’ denotes the share of household
with components aged less than 18. The variables under the heading ‘father’ denote the share of
households whose head has a father with 5 years of schooling or less, who is/was self-employed or a
public employee. ‘Self-employed’ includes the entrepreneurs. ‘Mover’ denotes the share of households
whose head has moved from his/her region of birth. ‘Job changer’ denotes the share of households whose
head has changed jobs more than twice. ‘Chronic disease’ refers to the share of households whose head is
chronically ill. Net worth and income are in million lira. The mean of the ‘saving rate’ is computed
excluding the top and bottom one percent of its distribution. ‘Risky assets’ include private bonds, stocks
and mutual funds. ‘Other insurance’ includes casualty and theft insurance. The mean and standard














Value of Z 1.82 11.19 2.21 2.71 0.05 5.0
Absolute risk aversion 0.158 -0.005 0.1507 0.05 0.08 0.20
Relative risk aversion (median) 6.03 -0.40 5.83 5.83 1.92 13.25
B. Characteristics
Age 48.50 49.34 48.54 13.61 31 68
Male (%) 79.24 93.75 79.84  40 0 1
Married (%) 78.58 87.50 78.95 41 0 1
No. of components 3.20 3.00 3.19 1.31 1 5
Children (%) 42.12 36.11 41.87 49 0 1
Area of birth (%): North 37.69 52.78 38.32 49 0 1
                              Center 21.61 19.44 21.52 41 0 1
                              South 39.20 25.69 38.64 49 0 1
Father (%): with 5
th grade 76.67 66.67 76.26 42.56 0 1
                  self-employed 31.20 32.64 31.26 46.36 0 1
                  public employee 14.73 16.67 14.81 35.52 0 1
C. Choices
Self-employed (%) 17.38 29.17 17.87 38.32 0 1
Entrepreneur (%) 14.70 19.44 14.89 35.61 0 1
Public employee (%) 27.55 27.08 27.53 44.67 0 1
Mover (%) 18.5 18.8 18.5 39 0 1
Job changer (%) 32.38 38.89 32.65 46.90 0 1
Years of education 9.25 10.81 9.31 4.28 5 16
Chronic disease (%) 19.76 36.11 20.45 40 0 1
Household net worth 275.22 537.28 286.13 431.65 3.91 641.01
Household income 47.45 72.02 48.48 36.23 17.49 84.60
Mean saving rate (%) 13.52 19.77 13.77 33.39 -23.20 48.52
Holders of (%): risky assets 13.46 36.11 14.40 35.12 0 1
                  life insurance 21.97 37.50 22.61 41.84 0 1
                  health insurance 8.96 13.19 9.14 28.82 0 0
                  other insurance 31.11 45.83 31.72 46.55 0 1
Expected earnings:     mean 25.38 31.41 25.59 18.88 8.82 42.50
               standard deviation 1.02 1.39 1.03 2.51 0 2.04
No. of observations 3,314 144 3,458 3,458 3,458 3,45830
Table II: Risk Aversion and Occupation Choice
The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is a self-employed (first two columns),
an entrepreneur (third and fourth column) or a public employee (last two columns). ‘Risk averse’ is a dummy for
whether the individual is risk averse. ‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of absolute risk aversion discussed
in the text and is defined only for the risk averse. Income and wealth are in hundred million lira. The occupation
dummies under the heading ‘father’ refer to the occupation of the father of the household head. Dummies of the
region of birth and for that of residence are also included. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%;




















Risk averse -0.256** -0.121 0.122
(0.130) (0.145) (0.127)
Abs. risk aversion -1.268** -0.838 1.298**
(0.644) (0.692) (0.590)
Income -0.114 -0.196* -0.328*** -0.433*** 0.153* 0.260***
(0.098) (0.110) (0.101) (0.124) (0.088) (0.098)
Wealth 0.080*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.109*** -0.028*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Liq. constraints 1.924 2.407 5.070** 5.925** -1.360 -2.426
(2.358) (2.436) (2.515) (2.598) (2.078) (2.131)
Background risk -6.821 -5.710 -5.546 -5.374 0.936 0.732
(5.104) (5.287) (5.540) (5.738) (4.280) (4.478)
Age 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.059*** 0.061***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
Age squared -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.129*** -0.122*** -0.051*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Gender -0.529*** -0.534*** -0.475*** -0.493*** -0.057 -0.053
(0.083) (0.085) (0.089) (0.091) (0.064) (0.065)
High sch. diploma -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.417*** -0.401*** 0.610*** 0.637***
(0.068) (0.070) (0.072) (0.075) (0.059) (0.060)
Univ. degree -0.247** -0.300*** -1.343*** -1.651*** 1.258*** 1.232***
(0.104) (0.111) (0.171) (0.215) (0.089) (0.093)
Chronic -0.165** -0.178** -0.134 -0.131 0.043 0.028
(0.080) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.065) (0.067)
Father: Self-empl. 0.393*** 0.406*** -0.031 -0.031
(0.061) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058)
Publ-empl. -0.126 -0.131 -0.185* -0.154 0.320*** 0.315***
(0.089) (0.092) (0.101) (0.105) (0.070) (0.071)
Entrepr. 0.367*** 0.391***
(0.065) (0.067)
Constant -1.840*** -1.951*** -2.578*** -2.481*** -2.937*** -3.060***
(0.433) (0.438) (0.480) (0.481) (0.353) (0.351)
Observations 3,374 3,234 3,374 3,234 3,374 3,23431
Table III: Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice
See note to Table II. ‘Risky assets’ include stocks, private bonds and mutual funds. The left-hand-
side variable for the regressions in the first two columns is a dummy equal to 1 if the household
head owns risky assets. ‘Risk averse’ is a dummy for whether the individual is risk averse.
‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of absolute risk aversion discussed in the text and is
defined only for the risk averse. Income and wealth are in hundred million lira. The left-hand-side
variable for the regressions in the tobit (last two columns) is the share of financial assets held in
risky assets. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
Variable Ownership of risky assets
(probit regressions)
Portfolio share of risky assets
(probit regressions)
(1) (3) (5) (7)
Whole sample The risk
averse
Whole sample The risk
averse
Risk averse -0.319** -0.165**
(0.130) (0.074)
Absolute risk aversion -1.731** -1.306***
(0.699) (0.424)
Income 0.897*** 0.899*** 0.335*** 0.409***
(0.107) (0.115) (0.051) (0.061)
Wealth 0.021*** 0.019** 0.011*** 0.010**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Liquidity constraints -0.305 0.374 0.289 0.779
(2.843) (2.995) (1.713) (1.848)
Background risk -1.420 -0.374 -0.407 -1.689
(6.284) (6.870) (3.775) (4.245)
Age 0.023 0.027 0.014 0.016
(0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Age squared -0.021 -0.024 -0.013 -0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
Gender -0.127 -0.133 -0.100** -0.099*
(0.081) (0.082) (0.049) (0.051)
High school diploma 0.416*** 0.425*** 0.252*** 0.256***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.043) (0.046)
University degree 0.498*** 0.510*** 0.326*** 0.307***
(0.102) (0.106) (0.059) (0.064)
Chronic -0.024 -0.034 -0.006 -0.017
(0.082) (0.087) (0.049) (0.052)
Constant -1.939*** -2.127*** -1.090*** -1.171***
(0.421) (0.433) (0.255) (0.268)
Number of observations 3,374 3,234 3,009 2,87732
Table IV: Risk Aversion and Demand for Insurance
See note to Table II. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head owns a life
insurance (first column), a health insurance (second column) or a theft or casualty insurance (third
column). ‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of absolute risk aversion discussed in the text and is
defined only for the risk averse. Income and wealth are in hundred million lira. The left-hand-side
variable for the tobit regressions are the ratios of the insurance premiums to household consumption.
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Variable Insurance ownership
(probit regressions)
Insurance premiums as a share of
consumption
(tobit regressions)













Abs. risk aversion -0.617 -2.090*** -1.900*** -0.052 -0.073*** -0.055***
(0.608) (0.761) (0.576) (0.039) (0.026) (0.016)
Income 0.496*** -0.016 0.426*** 0.023*** -0.000 0.002
(0.103) (0.123) (0.102) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Wealth 0.031*** 0.016* 0.052*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liq. constraints 0.340 1.244 3.326 0.081 -0.017 0.053
(2.277) (3.065) (2.268) (0.145) (0.103) (0.063)
Background risk 2.953 5.155 0.297 0.210 0.214 -0.171
(4.652) (6.825) (4.907) (0.294) (0.234) (0.140)
Age 0.120*** 0.058*** 0.025* 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Age squared -0.145*** -0.070*** -0.030** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Gender -0.145** -0.166* -0.153** -0.005 -0.003 -0.003*
(0.073) (0.096) (0.065) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
High sch. diploma 0.167*** 0.329*** 0.124** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.004**
(0.064) (0.081) (0.062) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Univ. degree 0.052 0.255** 0.100 0.006 0.009** 0.004
(0.097) (0.126) (0.096) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Self-employed 0.395*** 0.682*** 0.100 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.008***
(0.066) (0.080) (0.070) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Chronic -0.179** 0.055 0.099 -0.013** 0.002 0.001
(0.078) (0.097) (0.070) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Siblings -0.026* 0.020 -0.016 -0.002** 0.001 -0.000
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -3.284*** -2.286*** -0.630* -0.205*** -0.078*** -0.015
(0.423) (0.518) (0.332) (0.028) (0.018) (0.009)
Observations 3,234 3,234 3,238 3,238 3,238 3,223
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Table V: Risk Aversion and the Investment in Education
See note to Table II. The left-hand-side variable is the number of year of schooling
reported by the household head. ‘Risk averse’ is a dummy for whether the
individual is risk averse. ‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of absolute risk
aversion discussed in the text and is defined only for the risk averse. Income and
wealth are in hundred million lira. The education dummies under the heading
‘father’ refer to the education attainment of the father of the household head.
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
Variable Years of schooling
(1) (2)
Whole sample The risk averse
Risk averse -0.321** -
(0.165)






Liquidity  constraints -1.304 -1.180
(4.906) (4.977)










Father: Elem. school 2.415*** 2.322***
(0.142) (0.143)
 Jr. high school 4.267*** 4.203***
(0.207) (0.212)
 High sch. diploma 5.751*** 5.652***
(0.249) (0.253)






Table VI: Risk Aversion, Moving, Changing Jobs and one's Health
See note to Table II. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head lives in a region
different from the one where he/she was born (first two columns), if he/she has changed job at least twice over
his/her working life (third and fourth column) or if he/she is affected by a chronic disease (last two columns).
‘Risk averse’ is a dummy for whether the individual is risk averse. ‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of
absolute risk aversion discussed in the text and is defined only for the risk averse. Income and wealth are in
hundred million lira. The regressions in the first two columns include the dummies for the region of birth, but not
for the region of current residence. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
Variable Moving to another region
 (probit regressions)

















Risk averse -0.105 -0.074 -0.591***
(0.145) (0.116) (0.122)
Abs. Risk aversion -0.996** -0.764** 0.582
(0.430) (0.310) (0.641)
Income 0.001 0.001 -0.023 -0.072 0.018 0.111
(0.099) (0.111) (0.088) (0.098) (0.093) (0.108)
Wealth 0.014* 0.016** -0.011 -0.007 0.000 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Liquidity constraints -19.833*** -21.573*** 8.092*** 8.962*** 4.330* 4.551*
(2.112) (2.187) (2.025) (2.084) (2.260) (2.322)
Background risk -50.948*** -48.865*** 4.343 2.391 6.434 6.676
(3.775) (3.871) (4.210) (4.397) (4.667) (4.869)
Age 0.023 0.019 0.031** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Age squared -0.021 -0.017 -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.004 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Gender 0.115 0.102 -0.460*** -0.454*** 0.158** 0.171**
(0.070) (0.071) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067)
High sch. Diploma -0.050 -0.049 -0.233*** -0.245*** -0.101 -0.111
(0.068) (0.070) (0.057) (0.059) (0.067) (0.070)
Univ. degree 0.165* 0.130 -0.414*** -0.433*** -0.013 -0.039
(0.099) (0.103) (0.092) (0.096) (0.100) (0.105)
Chronic 0.083 0.087 0.215*** 0.208***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.062) (0.064)
Constant -1.125*** -0.988*** -0.786** -0.759** -2.643*** -3.500***
(0.384) (0.373) (0.322) (0.322) (0.396) (0.408)
Observations 3,374 3,234 3,378 3,238 3,374 3,234
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Table VII: Return, risk and risk aversion
The left-hand-side variable is household expected earnings in the first column and earnings
uncertainty in the second and third columns; earnings uncertainty is the standard deviation of the
subjective distribution of the household head expected earnings, as from Guiso  et al. (2002).
‘Absolute risk aversion’ is the measure of absolute risk aversion discussed in the text and is
defined only for the risk averse. Dummies for the region of residence are also included. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.  





Absolute risk aversion -49.838*** -6.665*** -1.370
(11.880) (1.769) (1.250)




Age 1.232*** -0.024 -0.154***
(0.463) (0.069) (0.048)
Age squared -1.372** 0.008 0.154***
(0.540) (0.080) (0.056)
Gender dummy 6.967*** 0.433** -0.307**
(1.448) (0.216) (0.153)
High school diploma 6.164*** 0.120 -0.535***
(1.146) (0.171) (0.121)
University degree 17.056*** 0.499** -1.314***
(1.625) (0.242) (0.179)
Constant -7.457 1.626 2.418**
(9.912) (1.476) (1.035)
Observations 1,027 1,027 1,027
R-squared 0.298 0.132 0.57436
Table VIII: Risk aversion, precautionary savings and self-selection
The left-hand-side variable is household saving rate. We exclude the top and bottom one
percent of the distribution. Dummies for the region of birth and for the region of
residence are also included. The sample is restricted to the risk averse. Standard errors
are reported in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **




Self-employed head -0.0399** -
(0.0159)




Age squared -0.0051* -0.0044
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Gender dummy 0.0445*** 0.0355**
(0.0147) (0.0146)
High school diploma 0.1186*** 0.1204***
(0.0136) (0.0135)
University degree 0.2001*** 0.1933***
(0.0197) (0.0199)
Household size 0.0223*** 0.0195***
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Dummy for children -0.0622*** -0.0575***
(0.0152) (0.0152)
No. of observations 3,197 3,197Appendix
The SHIW
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) collects detailed
data on demographics, households’ consumption, income and balance sheet items. The survey
was ﬁrst run in the mid-60s but has been available on tape only since 1984. Over time, it
has gone through a number of changes in sample size and design, sampling methodology and
questionnaire. However, sampling methodology, sample size and the broad contents of the
information collected have been unchanged since 1989. Each wave surveys a representative
sample of the Italian resident population and covers about 8,000 households, - although at
times speciﬁc parts of the questionnaire are asked to only a random sub-sample. Sampling
occurs in two stages, ﬁrst at municipality level and then at household level. Municipalities
are divided into 51 strata deﬁned by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more than
40,000, 20,000 to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are randomly selected from registry
ofﬁcerecords. They aredeﬁned as groupsofindividualsrelated byblood, marriageoradoption
and sharing the same dwelling. The head of the household is conventionally identiﬁed with
the husband, if present. If instead the person who would usually be considered the head
of the household works abroad or was absent at the time of the interview, the head of the
household is taken to be the person responsible for managing the household’s resources. The
net response rate (ratio of responses to households contacted net of ineligible units) was 57
percent in the 1995 wave. Brandolini and Cannari (1994) present a detailed discussion of
sample design, attrition, and other measurement issues and compare the SHIW variables with
the corresponding aggregate quantities.
Expected earnings and their variance
The variance and the expected value of individual earnings are computed as in Guiso et
al. (2002) and are based on the following questions that were asked in the SHIW.
(i) “Do you expect to voluntarily retire or stop working in the next 12 months?”
If the answer is “Yes” the interviewer goes on to the next survey section. If the answer
is “No” each respondent is asked questions (ii) through (v) below:38
(ii)  “What  are  the  chances  that  in  the  next  12  months  you  will  keep  your  job  or  find  one
(or start a new activity)? In other words, if you were to assign a score between 0 and 100 to the
chance  of  keeping  your  job  or  of  finding  one  (or  of  starting  a  new  activity),  what  score  would
you assign? (“0” if you are certain not to work, “100” if you are certain to work).
(iii)  Suppose  you  will  keep  your  job  or  that  in  the  next  12  months  you  will  find  one.
What is the minimum annual income, net of taxes and contributions, that you expect to earn
from this job?
(iv)  Again  suppose  you  will  keep  your  job  or  that  in  the  next  12  months  you  will  find
one. What is the maximum annual income, net of taxes and contributions, that you expect to
earn from this job?
(v) What are the chances that you will earn less than X (where X is computed by the
interviewer as [(iii)+(iv)]/2)? In other words, if you were to assign a score between 0 and 100
to the chance of earning less than X, what score would you assign? (“0” if you are certain to
earn more than X, “100” if you are certain to earn less than X).References
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